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RECENT CASES
cumulated earnings tax can apply 'to 'publicly held corportions." 28 The
holding of the court of appeals in' Golconda has two significant features;
First, there is an implicit rejection of any argument based on the "the-
oretically applicable" language found in the Senate report.2 9 Second, it
most likely draws the line between closely held and publicly held corpora-
tions at a limited group holding 50 percent or more of the stock.80
Regardless of what test is ultimately adhered to by the courts; the
impact of Golconda will be primarily one of relief to 'publicly held corpora-
tions after two and one-half years of confusion following the Tax Court's
decision. It also represents a retreat from the ever-increasing intrusion of
revenue agents and federal judges into the policy-making role of corporate
management.31 Golconda gives superficial relief to publicly held corpora-
tions by holding the tax not applicable in this case, but its overall effect is
to shift the emphasis to the criteria to be established in determining whether
a corporation is publicly held. No matter what standard is adopted, it
would seem that in the extreme case, such as that of .a publicly held
corporation deliberately availing itself to upper. bracket shareholders with
an announced policy of accumulating investment incomie,, the court will
find a -way to impose the tax of section 531.82
R. MIiHAEL BARON
WILLS - THE PRETERMITTED BIEIR IN MISSOURI
Vogel v. Mercantile Trust Company National Association'
The will of a testatrix who died in 1921 devised the residue of her
estate to a trustee to pay income to her only child for life, and then to
distribute ihe trust property to the namea bnly child of the life bene-
ficiary. Two more children were born to the life beneficiary after the
death of the testatrix. The life beneficiary, died in 1970. His two younger
children sued the trustee and their older sibling seeking intestate shares
in the, estate of the testatrix under the pretermitted heir statute in force
in 1921.2 The trial court sustained defendant's motion' for summary
28. 58 T.C. at 158.
29. Although the court recognized that this ,was the basis of the Tax Court
decision, it did not expressly reject this rationale. 507 l.2d at 595 96.
30. Id. at 597.
31. See Simons, The Gathering Storm of Section 531 of Our Tax Law, 44
TAmcs 528, 529 (1966).
32. BrrrKt & EusTE, supra note 4, f 8.08, at 8-80. See Whitmore, ,supra note
7, at 283.
1. 511 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1974).
2. ,Section 514, RSMo 1919, provided:
If any person make his last will, and- die, leaving a child or children,
or descendants of such child or children in case of their death, .not named
or provided for in such will, although born after -the *making. of such
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judgment on the ground that testatrix's only child, the father of the
plaintiffs, was named and provided for in the will. Thus, had testatrix
died intestate, plaintiffs would still have received nothing because their
father, who was then living, would have been the sole heir.3
The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment,4
stating that the statutory provisions for a child or children and for des-
cendants of such child or children in case of their death were made in
the alternative, and the word "their" necessarily referred back to "child
or children." 5 Thus, the provision for "descendants" did not become op-
erational unless a child or children did not survive the testator. The
plaintiffs tried to distinguish their case by the fact that their father
only received the income for life and thus could not leave anything to
his children, and by the fact that the fee estate did not vest in possession
until his death. The court found no merit in this argument, saying "[w]e
cannot see that this makes any difference." 6 The court cited Lawnich
v. Schultz7 for the proposition that any provision at all for the surviving
child is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. A contrary
holding would have meant that any descendant of a testator not provided
for or expressly excluded by a will, even one born years after the testator's
death, could demand the intestate share to which he would have been
entitled had his parent not survived the testator.
The idea behind pretermitted heir statutes, that of preventing un-
intentional disinheritance, has a long history. Under Roman law, a
person's children were entitled to a certain portion of their parents'
estate called a legitime. In order to defeat the rights of children in his
estate a testator was required to declare his intention expressly and name
or designate dearly the one to be disinherited.8 The law would not permit
the intention to disinherit to be inferred from silence. A child left out
could bring an action called querela inofficiosi testamenti, claiming
will, or the' death of the testator, every such testator, so far as shall regard
any such child: or children, or their descendants, not provided for, shall
be deemed to die intestate; and such child or children, or their descend-
. ants, shall be entitled to such proportion of the estate of the testator,
real and personal, as if he had died intestate.
The history of this statute and its subsequent amendment is discussed infra.
Plaintiffs also relied on section 304, RSMo 1919, which provided for inheritance
by posthumous descendants, contending that it brought them within the opera-
tion of section 514. The court dismissed this contention, saying that by definition
a posthumous descendant is one conceived during the lifetime of the testator
iliereas the plaintiffs here were born years after the testatrix's death.
3. 511 S.W.2d at 786.
4. Id. at 790.
5. Id. at 787.
6. Id.
7. 325 Mo. 294, 28 S.W.2d 658 (En Banc 1930). A five dollar bequest to a
daughter deceased at the execution of the will was held sufficient to exclude
her children from the, operation of the statute.
8. JUSTINIAN's INSrrrUtrs, Lib. 2, Tit. 13.
[Vol. 41
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unjust disinheritance, to have the will set aside.9 Under modem civil
law a system of forced heirs still restrains one's freedom of testation. 14
Certain heirs, generally the testator's parents and descendants, cannot
be deprived of their allotted share of the testator's estate, except for cer-
tain defined reasons which must be set out expressly in the will, along
with the name of the party to be disinherited.1
In early England a similar system of forced shares was enforced by
the ecclesiastical courts with regard to personal property.12 This practice
began to die out in the fourteenth century,13 but lasted until 1703 in
York and 1724 in London, having been expressly preserved by the Statute
of Distribution.' 4 Before the Statute of Wills in 154015 no testamentary
transfers of real property were allowed. After 1540 a tenant in fee simple
could devise two-thirds of his land held by military tenure, and all land
held by socage tenure. In 1660, when military tenure was converted into
socage tenure, a testator had complete freedom of testation as to his
real property.' 6 Thus from the time of the Restoration, English law
allowed a testator to cut off his heirs at law from succession to land by
will for any reason or no reason at all.
Soon afterwards, however, the English courts established the doc-
trine of revocation of a will by implication of law from change of cir-
cumstance.17 The earliest known case to enunciate this doctrine was
Overbury v. Overbury in 1682,'1 where it was held that the birth of a
child revoked a previously executed will bequeathing personal property.
In this case it was expressly stated that the doctrine was based on the
9. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUrEs, Lib. 2, Tit. 18; 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*503. Cicero tells of a case where a father willed his estate to a stranger upon the
mistaken belief that his son was dead. Upon petition the son was reinstated
to his inheritance. CICrao, DE ORAT. Lib. 1, c. 38.
10. ILA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1493-95 (West 1952).
11. Id. at art. 1617-21. The application of the civil law rule of forced
heirs concerning disinheritance of descendants is illustrated by Walet v. Darby,
167 La. 1095, 120 So. 869 (1929).
12. H. SWINBURN ON TEsTA NmTs AND WILLS, pt. 3, § 16. See also W.D. MAC-
DONALD, FRAUD ON THE Wmow's SHARE (1960).
13. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *493; Fratcher, Toward Uniforn Suc-
cession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1037, 1051 (1966).
14. Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, § 4 (1670); W. BLACKsTONE,
supra note 13, at *519.
15. 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540). However, a tenant in fee simple could accomplish
the same result by means of a feoffment to the use of the feoffor or to such uses as
he might by will appoint or some similar use of the use device. See Fratcher,
Uses of Uses, 34 Mo. L. Rrv. 39, 52 (1969).
16. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *12; Fratcher, supra note 15.
17. See generally Graunke and Beuscher, The Doctrine of Implied Revoca-
tion of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L.
REv. 386, 387-94 (1930).
18. 2 Show. 242, 89 Eng. Rep. 915 (1682). "[]f a man make his will and
dispose of his personal estate amongst his relations and afterwards has children
and dies... this is a revocation of his will." Graunke and Beuscher, supra note 17,




Krueger: Kureger: Wills--the Pretermitted Heir in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
civil law querela inofficiosura testamentum.19 In later cases this doctrine was
clarified to require both the birth of issue and marriage subsequent to
the will in question,2 0 was extended to devises of land21 and made post-
humous children possible heirs.2 Two theories were given for revocation
in these cases: (1) to give effect to the assumed intent of the testator
to revoke his will on such a drastic change in circumstances, 23 and (2)
as a tacit condition annexed to the will itself, at the time it was made,
that the testator did not intend that it should take effect if there should
be a total change in the situation of his family.24
This is as far as the English doctrine progressed in the courts, 25
and the common law rule remained that birth of issue alone did not
revoke the will of a man made subsequent to his marriage.10 The reason
given for this rule was that after marriage a man is presumed to con-
template the birth of issue and to take this into account when making
his will.2t The Wills Act of 1837 did away with the doctrine of revocation
on marriage and birth of issue 28 and provided for revocation of a will by
implication of law only upon a subsequent marriage.29 This remained the
state of the law in England until passage of the Inheritance (Family
Provision) Act in 1938.30
19. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
20. Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk. 592, 91 Eng. Rep. 497 (1689).
21. Brown v. Thoman, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 413, 21 Eng. Rep. 1142 (1701).
22. Christopher v. Christopher, 4 Bur. 2182, 98 Eng. Rep. 138 (1771).
23. Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk. 592, 91 Eng. Rep. 497 (1689).
24. Doe ex dem. Lancashire v. Lancashire, 5 T.R. 49, 101 Eng. Rep. 28 (1792).
25. See Johnston v. Johnston, 1 Phill. Ecc. 447, 161 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1817).
Here the court admitted that there had been no previous case where birth of
children alone or marriage alone had been sufficient to revoke a will. Neverthe-
less, referring to civil law, it seemed to say that birth of issue alone might be
enough if accompanied by "other strong circumstances." See 4 J. KENT, CoN Ntxw-
TARIEs ON A xxucAN LA.v 524 (13th ed. 1884).
26. Easterlin v. Easterlin, 62 Fla. 468, 56 So. 688 (1911); W. PAGE, TNE LAW
oF Wnis § 514, at 943 (3d ed. 1941). The common law rule was enacted in Mis-
souri by Section 7, at 1079, RSMo 1845 (superseded and repealed in 1955 by
Section 474.240 RSMo 1969).
27. W. PAGE, note 26 supra.
28. 1 Vict., c. 26, § 19 (1837), provides: "No will shall be revoked by any
presumption of an intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances."
29. Id. at § 18. See Note, 17 Mica. L. Rxv. 331, 332 (1919).
30. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45, §1, provides in part:
Whereas, after the commencement of this Act, a person dies domiciled in
England leaving-
a) a wife or husband;
b) a daughter who has not been married, or who is, by reason of some
mental or physical disability, incapable of maintaining herself;
c) an infant son; or
d) a son who is, by reason of some mental or physical disability, incapable
of maintaining himself; and leaving a will, then, if the court ... is of
the opinion that the will does not make reasonable provision for the
maintenance ..., the court may order that such reasonable provision as
the court thinks fit shall ... be made out of the testators net estate for
the maintenance of that dependent. ....
The Intestates Estates Act, 15 &c 16 Geo. 6 &c 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64, § 7 (1952), extended the
[Vol. 41
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In this country the common law rule that the birth of issue alone
would not revoke a previous will was not well received because it fre-
quently resulted in disinheriting after-born children whom the testator
probably never meant to disinherit. Early in the history of the American
colonies statutes were enacted to mitigate the consequences of the com-
mon law rule,3 1 the earliest being enacted in Massachusetts in 1700.32
These statutes generally provided that if the testator did not mention
or provide for his children in his will, he was considered to die intestate
as to those not mentioned. The origin of these statutes is undear, because
there was no English precedent for them. It may be that they were de-
rived from the Roman law idea of inofficiosurn testamentum, but they
may have developed on their own from the same sense of parental ob-
ligation which inspired the Roman law.33 Unlike the civil law system of
forced heirs, the American pretermitted heir statutes are based upon a
presumption that the omission of the child is unintentional and that
the actual intention of the testator is not to disinherit his issue.3 4
The first Missouri pretermitted heir statute was enacted by the leg-
islature of the Territory of Louisiana on July 4, 1807. 35 It was reenacted
with no significant changes in language, by the legislature of the Terri-
tory of Missouri in 181536 and again by the General Assembly of the
provision to intestates' estates. See Crane, Family Provision On Death in English
Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 984 (1960).
31, KENT, supra note 25, at 526-27.
32. 1 Acrs AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MAssAcisusms B.Y, Ch. 4, at
430 (1700), provides in part:
That any child or children not having a legacy given them in the will of
their father or mother, every such child shall have a proportion of the
estate of their parents given and set out unto them as the law directs
for the distribution of the estates of intestates.
33. See Dainow, Inheritance by Pretermitted Children, 32 ILL. L. REv. 1
(1937); Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COLUm. L. REv.
748 (1929); Touster, Testamentary Freedom and Social Control-After-born Chil-
dren, 6 Btr .o L. REv. 251 (1957). Dainow conjectures that the common law
revocation upon marriage and birth of issue was changed by substituting the
word "or" for "and' making it marriage or birth of issue. The next step was
separation of birth of issue from marriage. GA. CODE § 113-408 (1933) is given as
an example of the intermediate form. Dainow, supra, at 2.
34. McCourtney v. Mathes, 47 Mo. 533, 535 (1870); Guitar v. Gordon, 17
Mo. 408, 411 (1854); Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594 (1834); Dainow, supra note 33,
at 3; Mathews, supra note 32, at 749; Note, The Establishment of the Rights of
Pretermitted Children Born Prior to the Execution of a Will, 16 IowA L. REv.
244 (1930). For a summary of American pretermitted heir statutes as of 1960, see
Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 892-98 (1960).
35. Act of July 4, 1807, 1 Trait. LAws, p. 132, § 22, provides in part:
Where any person shall make his or her last will and testament and
omits to mention the name of any child or children or afterwards shall
marry or have a child or children not provided for in any such will, and
die leaving a widow and child, or either widow or child, although such
child be born after the death of its father, every such person, so far as shall
regard the widow or such child or children, shall be deemed to die in-
testate....
36. Act of Jan. 21, 1815, 1 Trut. LAws, p. 405, § 28.
1976]
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State of Missouri in 1821.37 The origin of this statute is also unclear,
but the French civil law influence might have provided part of the in-
spiration. Perhaps this explains why this early statute applied whenever
a pretermitted heir was not "provided for," which implied the receipt of
some beneficial interest, whereas later statutesa8 have required that the
heir be "not mentioned." The pretermitted heir statute in force until
1955 was enacted in 1825 with substantially different wording but with
the same meaning as the 1821 statute.3 9 After Block v. Block40 in 1834,
in which it was questioned whether an express disinheritance was a
"providing for" with the meaning of the statute, the General Assembly
at its October term that same year amended the statute to read "not
named or provided for" to make it clear that the child need not receive
any positive benefit.41
The Missouri courts have given their statute a different interpreta-
tion from that of many other states, notably the "Massachusetts type"
statute.4 2 As early as 1857 the Missouri Supreme Court said in Bradley
v. Bradley43 that the Missouri statute, unlike the Massachusetts statute,
does not take into account mistake or intentional omission; thus, if a
child is not mentioned, the statute automatically operates.4 4 In this re-
spect the Missouri statute operates mechanically-i.e., if children are not
sufficiently mentioned in the will the statute applies no matter what
other evidence shows that the testator in fact intended to disinherit the
omitted child.4 5 The severity of this rule was somewhat eased in later
cases by the holding that the child need not be mentioned by name and
that any reference which indicates that the omitted party was in the
mind of the testator is sufficient to satisfy the statute.40 The net effect
37. Act of Dec. 1, 1821, 1 Tr.R. LAWS, p. 787, § 4.
38. See, e.g., MAss. GFN. LAws ANN. C. 191, § 20 (1958).
39. Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594, 597 (1884).
40. Id. This was the first recorded case to interpret this statute.
41. Bradley v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311, 312 (1857).
42. The "Massachusetts type" statute is similar to Missouri's except that it
contains the qualifying phrase "unless they have been provided for by the
testator in his life dine or unless it appears that the omission was intentional and
not occasioned by accident or mistake." MAss. Gnu. LAws ANN. C. 191, § 20 (1958),
as amended, (Supp. 1969). See 26A C.J.S. Descent 6 Distribution, § 45 at 590
(1956).
43. 24 Mo. 811 (1857).
44. Williamson v. Roberts, 187 S.W. 19 (Mo. 1916); Bradley v. Bradley, 24
Mo. 311, 312 (1857).
45. Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); Thomas v. Black, 113
Mo. 66, 20 S.W. 657 (1892); Bradley v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311 (1857).
46. Zillig v. Patzer, 865 Mo. 787, 287 S.W.2d 771 (1956) ("Between all of
you" held sufficient naming of children); Miller v. Aven, 827 Mo. 20, 34 S.W.2d
116 (En Banc 1980) (S5 to daughter who predeceased testatrix sufficient to
prevent pretermission of her children); Ernshaw v. Smith, 2 S.W.2d 803 (Mo.
1928) (contingent remainder to grandchildren who survive life tenant sufficient
providing for all grandchildren); Fitzsimmons v. Quinn, 282 S.W. 37 (Mo. 1926)
(appointment as executor sufficient for son); Woods v. Drake, 185 Mo. 893, 87
S.W. 109 (1896) (naming four grandchildren satisfies statute as to their mother);
[Vol. 41
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is that under a Massachusetts-type statute extrinsic evidence is admitted
to show an intention to disinherit,47 whereas in Missouri any evidence
offered to rebut the presumption of inadvertent omission must appear
within the four comers of the will.48 Because of this, the Missouri statute
has in many instances operated to defeat the true intention of the tes-
tator, in that the presumption that an omission of a child or descendant
is unintentional may often be unsound. Thus, despite the assertions of
the courts to the contrary,49 it is a kind of ritual formalism that governs
whether the testator's omitted heir can take, not the testator's true in-
tention.
In 1955, as part of a major revision of Missouri's probate code, the
previous pretermitted heir statute was repealed and replaced by section
474.240, RSMo 1969. 50 Although no reported decisions have yet inter-
preted this statute, it would appear to make three substantial changes
in prior Missouri law as to pretermitted children. First, it expressly
applies only to children born or adopted after the making of the testator's
last will, while the previous statute applied to children born both prior
Hockensmith v. Slusher, 26 Mo. 237 (1858) (bequest to son-in-law sufficient for
daughter); Beck v. Metz, 25 Mo. 70 (1857) ("children" sufficient for daughter).
In Hockensmith the court set out the general rule:
[W'henever the mention of one person, by a natural association of ideas,
suggests another, it may reasonably be inferred that the latter was in the
mind of the testator and was not forgotten or unintentionally omitted.
Hockensmith v. Slusher, supra, at 240.
47. White v. White, 322 Mass. 30, 76 N.E.2d 15 (1947); Buckley v. Gerard,
123 Mass. 8 (1877); Wilson v. Fosket, 6 Met. (Mass.) 400 (1843); W. PAGE, TnE
LAw OF Wxus § 530 at 992 (3d ed. 1941); King, Statutory Status of Pretermitted
Heirs, 13 BOSTON U. L. REv. 672 (1933); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 209 (1935).
48. Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); Conrad v. Conrad,
280 S.W. 707 (Mo. 1926); Pounds v. Dale, 48 Mo. 270 (1871); Batley v. Batley,
239 Mo. App. 664, 193 S.W.2d 64 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946); W. PAGE, note 47 supra,§ 530 at 990; Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 211 (1935).
49. Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408 (1853); Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594 (1834).
In Block the court said: "The true intent of the testator is to govern all things
and where it is dear it must prevail." Id. at 596.
50. Section 474.240, RSMo 1969, corresponds to section 41 of The Model
Probate Code and provides:
1. When a testator fails in his will to mention or provide for any
of his children born or adopted after the making of his last will, such
child, whether born before or after the testator's death, shall receive a
share in the estate of the testator equal in value to that which he would
have received if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from the
will that such omission was intentional, or unless when the will was exe-
cuted the testator had one or more children known to him to be living
and devised substantially all his estate to his surviving spouse.
2. If, at the time of the making of his will, the testator believes that
any of his children are dead, and fails to provide for such child in his
will, the child shall receive a share in the estate of the testator equal in
value to that which he would have received if the testator bad died in-
testate, unless it appears from the will or from other evidence that the
testator would not have devised anything to such child had he known
that the child was alive.
1976]
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to and after the making of the will.51 This change recognizes the fact
that it is highly unlikely that a parent would inadvertently omit a child
who was alive when the will was made. Section 474.240(2) makes an
exception where the testator believed, at the time of the execution of the
will, that a child born prior to the will was dead, unless it appears that
the omitted child would have taken nothing anyway. Second, the statute
is inapplicable to after-born children if the testator had one or more
children living at the time the will was executed and devised substan-
tially all of his estate to his spouse.52 Third, and most significant with
respect to the question raised in Vogel, no provision is made for omitted
grandchildren or more remote issue.53
The Uniform Probate Code was promulgated for adoption in August
1969 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in cooperation with the American Bar Association Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law.54 In late 1972 the Subcommittee for
Revision of Missouri Probate Laws was appointed by the Missouri
Bar Committee on Probate and Trusts and in subsequent meetings the
Subcommittee decided that instead of seeking enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code in Missouri, it would use it as a drafting model for a bill
amending specific portions of the Missouri Probate Code of 1955. 5r
The Draft of the 1976 amendments to the Missouri Probate Code of
1955, 1 October 1975, which has been approved by the Probate and
Trusts Committee and the Board of Governors of The Missouri Bar,
would make several changes affecting the status of the pretermitted heir
in Missouri. Section 474.010 would be amended to conform to section
2-102 of the Uniform Probate Code,56 which gives the surviving spouse
the first $50,000 of the estate plus half of the remainder where there
is no issue by another spouse. Thus in most estates there would be no
intestate share left about which omitted children could dispute. Amended
section 474.060 would conform to section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate
Code,57 making illegitimates children of their father as well as of their
51. § 514, RSMo 1919. See, e.g., Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707(1944); Thomas v. Black, 113 Mo. 66, 20 S.W. 657 (1892); Block v. Block, 3
Mo. 594 (1834).
52. See Editorial Comment, 26 V.A.M.S. 558 (1956).
53. For other articles concerning the pretermitted heir in Missouri, see
Elbert, Advancements and the Right of Retainer in Missouri, 18 Mo. L. REv.
249, 258 (1953); Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. Rzv.
467 (1958); Lewis, Adoption-Descent and Distribution-Right of Adopted Child
to Take from Natural Parent Under Pretermitted Heir Statute, 19 Mo. L. REv. 86
(1954).
54. To date eleven states have enacted the Uniform Probate Code: Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota and South Dakota. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 54 (Master
Ed., 1975 Supp.).
55. Proposed 1975 Amendments to the Missouri Probate Code of 1955, 30
J. Mo. B. 500 (1974).
56. UNIFoMt PROBATE CODE, § 2-102, 8 U.L.A. 323 (Master Ed. 1972).
57. Id. at § 2-109.
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mother for purposes of intestate succession if paternity is established and
the father had treated the child as his during his life. This would allow
a new group of people to claim an intestate share as a pretermitted heir.
Finally, the Draft of 1 October 1975 would substitute section 2-302 of
the Uniform Probate Code58 for present section 474.240. This amendment
would deprive children who would otherwise come within the statute
of an intestate share if the testator devises substantially all of his estate
to their "other parent" rather than his "surviving spouse," as the 1955
Code reads. Also, a new exception is added to the operation of the statute
where the testator has provided for the child outside of the will.5 9
The net effect of the 1955 Code is to make the pretermitted heir
statute a vehicle for furthering a testator's probable intent rather than
a trap to thwart the intention of the unwary. An attempt is made to
balance the societal values of parental duty and familial obligation which
call for the protection of children from disinheritance60 with the common
law idea of freedom of testation. Section 474.240 is an indication that
the ideal of freedom of testation is becoming predominant,6 1 at least
where disinheritance of descendants of the testator is concerned. The
amendments proposed by The Missour Bar would seem to be a continu-
ation of this trend.
STEVEN C. KRUEGER
58. Id. at § 2-302.
59. On October 18, 1975 the Board of Governors unanimously approved the
Draft of 1 October 1975 and recommended it for enactment by the General As-
sembly.
60. See Fratcher, Protection of the Family Against Disinheritance in American
Law, 14 INTL & Comp. L. Q. 298 (1965); Note, Limitations on Testamentary
Power in Missouri: Protection of the Spouse and Children of the Testator, 1954
WAsH. U.L.Q. 354. In the latter article the author advocates changing the pre-
termitted heir statute so as to give a minor child of the testator absolute pro-
tection against disinheritance.
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